


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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS













Week Ending 22 January 1972

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NSA review completed

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1972
Weekly average for each monthOCTOBER 1971 - JANUARY 1972
Weekly data as reported

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary



Enemy Activity

In Long Tieng, the situation remained basically unchanged during the week, although allied forces now hold all of Skyline Ridge. The Communists still have sizable forces in reserve which they have not yet committed to an all-out attack on Long Tieng and the battle there is far from over, but the allied position has at least momentarily improved. The focal point of allied concern for the security of north Laos shifted temporarily at the end of the week to Sala Phou Khoun, where Highway 4/7 joins National Route 13 -- the major supply artery between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. The enemy overran friendly positions defending this key road junction, and scarce reinforcements had to be brought up to protect the access route to the Vientiane Plain. Northeast of Luang Prabang, the enemy has been gradually moving westward and may seek eventually to isolate the Royal Capital, as he did last spring for a brief period. There was a moderate increase of enemy activity in the central Panhandle, particularly in the Dong Hene area along Route 9, but enemy activity decreased west of the Bolovens Plateau in the southern Panhandle.

During the week in Cambodia, enemy-initiated combat was very low. The Communists have, however, been active in an attempt to sever key lines of communication, as part of their continuing effort to stifle the flow of food stuffs to Phnom Penh. On the friendly side, mounting internal problems are threatening the military effectiveness of the elite Khmer Krom units. Heavy combat losses, a disproportionate share of the combat load, and insufficient government support have caused a decline in morale which has manifested itself by a growing desertion rate.

In South Vietnam, enemy-initiated military activity was also generally at a low level. Perhaps as the harbinger of things to come, however, the Communists did step up the pace of their combat activity in the lowland areas of Military Regions (MR) 1 and 2. The high level of infiltration of men and supplies into the Demilitarized Zone, western MR 1, and the Highlands of MR 2 suggests that the Communists hope to mount their strongest military challenge in these areas since Tet 1968. There are strong indications that some three Communist divisions are being moved into an area that extends from the Demilitarized Zone south to the Western Highlands. These divisions may be expected to join forces with other units already in place. The Communists are also reported to be telling their cadre in South Vietnam that a military campaign, which they characterize as "massive," is scheduled to be conducted in the populated areas of South Vietnam timed to coincide with the President's visit to Peking.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

Personnel infiltration continued at a fairly high level during the week as 8,900 men were added to the infiltration totals. This raises to 68,500-70,500 the number of infiltrators accepted as destined for South Vietnam-Cambodia since 1 October 1971 -- a total considerably higher than last year at this time. There may be an additional several thousand infiltrators in the pipeline on whom the evidence is not yet firm. Cumulative enemy supply movements to date remain below last year's totals, but Communist logistics activity has risen sharply with the start of the January "general transportation offensive." If the acceleration in movement which has been noted in the past two or three weeks continues, the enemy could surpass his input totals for the comparable 1970-71 period by mid-February -- a logistics effort entirely within the capabilities of the system.

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